**Eurasia Program**

**Portfolio review: The cotton campaign**

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Category: CEP002: Ending Forced Labor in Uzbekistan's Cotton Sector

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# OSF Support for the Cotton Campaign

The goal of OSF’s support for the cotton campaign is to create and sustain diplomatic, economic and public pressure on the government of Uzbekistan, the second largest exporter of cotton in the world, to end state-sponsored forced labor of adults and children. The scope of the problem is significant: according to the ILO, some 2.2 million people around the world are forced to labor by governments; in Uzbekistan, the government annually coercively mobilizes no less than 1 million citizens to pick cotton.[[1]](#footnote-1) The government instructs farmers what to plant, sets production quotas and prices, and monopolizes processing and sales to bring much-needed foreign currency into the government’s coffers. Profits go into a non-transparent slush fund controlled by the country’s top leadership.

While forced labor is used in other sectors, such as grain and silk production and construction, we chose to focus on its use in the cotton harvest because so many people are involuntarily involved and it is such an important financial pillar of Uzbekistan’s authoritarian system. Since our first grant in 2004, OSF has brought multiple tools to bear on this intractable problem, including grant making, research, direct advocacy and our convening power.

When we began work on the campaign in 2004, we aimed to hold the government of Uzbekistan accountable for its violation of human and environmental rights working through the prism of cotton industry. It took a few years to determine that the best way to make progress on this general goal was to focus on a concrete and tangible rights violation that affects over a million citizens. In the past few years the cotton campaign has benefited from a world-wide renewed interest in issues of forced labor (which was inspired in part by an international interest in anti-trafficking that began in the early 2000s). In 2008, the first UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of slavery was appointed; in 2013, the first Global Slavery Index published; and in June 2014, the International Labour Conference adopted a legally binding international Protocol to respond to today’s challenge of forced labour worldwide.[[2]](#footnote-2)

In 2012, our campaign reached a significant goal when the Uzbek government stopped the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of children younger than fifteen. In 2013, Uzbekistan invited the International Labor Organization (ILO) to monitor the use of child labor during the fall harvest. Unfortunately, this did not address our overall aim of ending forced labor as the government shifted the burden of involuntary harvesting onto older children and adults, which was outside the ILO’s monitoring.

The campaign has primarily used high level advocacy with international organizations, especially the ILO, to reach its aims. Now that the first gains have been made, it may become more difficult to keep the diplomatic pressure on Uzbekistan as many in the ILO, U.S. government and the EU are eager to reward progress.

To develop international awareness of forced labor in Uzbekistan and put pressure on the government, the campaign realized in 2008 that it would be a tremendous advantage to bring brands and retailers on board. As of July 2014, 152 major Western brands and retailers have signed a public pledge not to knowingly source cotton from Uzbekistan.[[3]](#footnote-3) Nevertheless, each year Uzbekistan finds buyers – largely in Bangladesh, China and Russia – for its entire cotton crop. The campaign helped create a media uproar in 2011 that resulted in Gulnara Karimova (the daughter of the Uzbek president and herself, at the time, a government official) being banned from showing her clothing line at New York’s Fashion Week. However, it has been less successful in creating an effective media strategy to guide its overall work.

Another country within the Eurasia Program where the state systematically forces people into labor is Turkmenistan, also a significant cotton exporter. In 2013, we provided a small grant to conduct monitoring in Turkmenistan, which revealed that thousands of adults, mostly working in the public sector, are compulsory mobilized to pick cotton. So far the campaign has not yet undertaken advocacy efforts on Turkmenistan as the scale of the problem is bigger in Uzbekistan; we prefer not to further build on our recent advocacy gains regarding Uzbekistan.

# Campaign Funding, Structure and History

Although the cotton campaign began in 2004, this portfolio review focuses on activities beginning from fall 2010. Since then, OSF allocated 27 grants and commissioned seven consultancies, representing a total investment of more than $2.1 million. (A full list of cotton campaign-related grants since 2010 is provided in Annex 1).

By 2010, the campaign had developed into a coalition of stakeholders including NGOs, trade unions, socially responsible investors, business associations and companies. Most coalition members are based in the U.S. and Europe, but one South Korean and two Australian NGOs have joined in the past two years. The coalition includes three Uzbek NGOs, two based in Europe and one in Uzbekistan. The most active and dedicated coalition members include:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| No. | Name of organization | Category of organization | Receiving OSF grant for participating in the cotton campaign | | Steering group membership |
| 2013 | 2014 |
| 1 | Advocates for Public Interest Law (APIL) | NGO |  |  | Yes |
| 2 | American Apparel and Footwear Association | Business association |  |  |  |
| 3 | American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) | Trade union |  |  | Yes |
| 4 | American Federation of Teachers (AFT) | Trade union |  |  | Yes |
| 5 | Anti-Slavery International (ASI) | NGO | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 6 | Association for Human Rights in Central Asia | NGO |  |  | Yes |
| 7 | Baptist World Aid | NGO |  |  |  |
| 8 | Boston Common Asset Management | Social investor |  |  |  |
| 9 | Calvert Investments | Social investor |  |  | Yes |
| 10 | Child Labor Coalition | Coalition |  |  | Yes |
| 11 | European Center on Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) | NGO | Yes |  |  |
| 12 | Human Rights Watch (HRW) | NGO |  |  | Yes |
| 13 | Inkota netzwerk eV | NGO |  |  |  |
| 14 | International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) | NGO | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 15 | International Organisation of Employers (IOE) | Business association |  |  |  |
| 16 | International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) | Trade union |  |  |  |
| 17 | Justice & International Mission Synod of Victoria and Tasmania Uniting Church in Australia | NGO |  |  | Yes |
| 18 | National Retail Federation | Business association |  |  |  |
| 19 | Open Society Foundations (OSF) | Foundation |  |  | Yes |
| 20 | Responsible Sourcing Network (RSN) | NGO | Yes |  | Yes |
| 21 | Retail Industry Leaders Association | Business association |  |  |  |
| 22 | Solidarity Center | NGO |  |  | Yes |
| 23 | Stop the Traffik Australia | NGO |  |  |  |
| 24 | United States Fashion Industry Association | Business association |  |  |  |
| 25 | Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights | NGO | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 26 | Walk Free | NGO |  |  | Yes |

This list demonstrates that only a handful of NGOs are receiving OSF financial support, others volunteer. Through its overall aid, OSF plays an important convening role, and has been able to gradually integrate new stakeholders which were not part of the original group.

Initially OSF provided individual grants to partners but as the coalition grew it became apparent that a coordinating structure was also necessary. Until fall 2011, ILRF’s Director Bama Athreya served as the informal U.S. campaign coordinator and her departure came just as the campaign achieved a significant success at New York Fashion Week. The coalition’s failure to agree on a follow-up strategy to take advantage of this gain convinced us of the need to hire a full-time coordinator.

Since 2011 the OSF has not only convened stakeholders and provided some grants, but also worked closely with the coalition to develop its capacity, professionalism and ultimately, we hope, its independence from OSF. In 2011, OSF persuaded the coalition to form a Steering Committee (of which OSF is a member). Because the coalition is not registered as an independent legal entity, in 2012 OSF added to ILRF’s grant a sum sufficient to host this position. Steering Committee members actively engaged to select the coordinator, hiring Matthew Daly, who has significantly improved campaign activities’ coordination, including convening monthly Steering Committee conference calls and maintaining intensive contacts with key coalition members. The coordinator has not however done enough to improve the campaign’s media strategy or outreach via the coalition’s website, www.cottoncampaign.org. He is not a communications expert and has insufficient time to invest in media work. We are concerned that coordinator’s reporting responsibilities may also cause some conflicts between campaign members in the future. We monitor this closely.

The coalition is based on the following division of labor:

* Uzbek NGOs (principally the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights) are responsible for monitoring and documenting the practice of forced labor in Uzbekistan and assisting advocacy efforts;
* ILRF, As You Sow, APIL, Walk Free, the American Apparel and Footwear Association, and participating retailers, textile companies and trade association focus on economic pressure;
* OSF, ILRF, Anti-Slavery International, ITUC, IOE, AFT, AFL-CIO and Calvert work on diplomatic leverage through outreach to the ILO, the U.S. government and EU institutions;
* The cotton campaign coordinator is in charge of the campaign’s public efforts, editing the cottoncampaign.org website and running the Twitter feed(@cottoncampaign).

There are a number of tensions in the coalition concerning the selection of advocacy tools and strategy. Some NGO members, for example, tend to favor a more confrontational approach to businesses while other NGOs – and, of course business associations and individual firms – favor a more cooperative one. A number of businesses are committed to the cotton campaign and support its advocacy efforts. The work of the campaign is also more central to some members (generally NGOs) than it is to others (unions, business associations and companies).

The aforementioned tensions notwithstanding, the coalition’s diversity is one of its greatest assets. We get a very different official hearing with business associations, major companies and unions in the room than with just human rights groups. Unions and employers’ groups have been particularly helpful in engaging the ILO, as they represent two-thirds of the ILO’s tripartite constituency (along with governments) where they play an important decision-making role.

Unfortunately, the coalition’s success in engaging U.S. based unions and business associations have not been replicated in the EU. In 2010, after a long and difficult search, OSF provided a grant to the UK-based Anti-Slavery International (ASI) to coordinate the coalition’s activities in Europe. While this NGO has been very successful in reaching out to trade unions, EU institutions and ILO, it failed so far to build up a pan-European network of stakeholders. We were planning on no longer funding ASI specifically for EU coordination, but are considering giving them another chance as they claim that they now have broader partnerships with NGOs, trade unions and businesses across the Europe to take advantage of.

# Campaign Goals, Objectives and Advocacy Tools and Targets

The campaign seeks to bring economic, diplomatic and public pressure on the government of Uzbekistan to end the use of forced and child labor in the cotton sector. In 2004, when the campaign was originally created, the focus on ending forced labor was not clear. More broadly OSF and its partners sought to improve Uzbekistan’s human rights and environmental protection record. But in the aftermath of the Andijon massacre in 2005 and the harsh crackdown on civil society that followed, the campaign chose to emphasize social and economic rights and developed into a single issue-based campaign by 2006.

To achieve this goal the coalition pursues the following objectives:

* Ensure that the EU, the U.S., the ILO and other multilateral organizations make ending forced labor a key ask in their dialogue with the Uzbek government;
* Ensure that major Western retailers and brands remove Uzbek cotton and textiles from their supply chain until Uzbekistan meets its obligations under ILO labor standards;
* Create significant reputational damage for Uzbekistan until it ends forced labor;
* Deprive Uzbekistan of various tariff benefits provided by the U.S. and the EU through mechanisms such as the Generalized System of Preferences;
* Use laws such as the U.S. Tariff Act to prevent the import of goods made with Uzbek cotton;
* Press foreign companies invested in the textile sector in Uzbekistan to divest;
* Encourage IFIs to embed stricter conditionality and safeguards in loans allocated to agriculture and education.

# Accomplishments and Challenges to Date

Prior to 2011, the campaign’s major success was Uzbekistan’s signature and ratification of two key ILO conventions on child labor (Nos 138 and 182). The Uzbek authorities failed, however, to fully implement them. For several years they continued to force children as young as eleven to pick cotton, and even today children between the ages of fifteen and seventeen years oldtake part in harvests against their will.

As a result of the cotton campaign’s efforts, 152 brands and companies representing more than $1 trillion in market capitalization have signed a pledge against buying products produced with Uzbek cotton. However, only fifteen have made efforts to implement this pledge in practice, collecting data on cotton country-of-origin from their textile or yarn mills. Nine of them have visited the mills (most of which are based in Bangladesh) to ensure they are not purchasing Uzbek cotton. Some of the less proactive companies have argued that because raw cotton enters so many rungs down the supply chain it is impractical for them to do this. As a result, today there is still no system of country-of-origin markings for raw cotton. Cotton from numerous suppliers is blended early in the textile manufacturing process, which makes detection difficult. Moreover, there are many thousands of spinners and yarn mills, many of which are located in China and Bangladesh where even the coalition’s most committed labor rights NGOs prioritize other issues. That is why last year we decided to discontinue financially supporting As You Sow, which led this work to make supply chains more transparent.

Instead, we decided to target companies that invest into the Uzbekistan’s textile industry as it is much easier to trace down the country origin of textile commodities. In 2012, the coalition began a major effort to seek to persuade Daewoo International, the largest foreign investor in Uzbekistan’s textile processing sector, to divest. After Daewoo refused to engage constructively, the campaign pressed apparel companies to stop doing business with Daewoo’s textile worldwide. Five companies, including IKEA, H&M and Nike agreed to do so, in the latter two cases only after public pressure campaigns by the coalition.

In May 2013, ILRF filed a complaint against Indorama Kokand Textile, an Uzbek-Singaporean JV, under the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, which bans the import of commodities produced by forced labor. In October, U.S. authorities in Los Angeles stopped a shipment of 22 tons of yarn produced in Uzbekistan by Indorama. This was a blow to the Uzbek government’s ambitious plans to increase cotton textile export, and a lesson for other potential foreign investors.

Through advocacy with EU institutions and members of the European Parliament, the campaign, represented by Anti-Slavery International and in cooperation with the OSI-Brussels, succeeded in ensuring that the European Parliament rejected a Protocol to the EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that would have extended the Agreement to cover textiles in December 2011.

In 2010, another coalition member, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, and its allies filed OECD complaints against seven major importers of Uzbek cotton in the UK, France, Switzerland and Germany alleging that their purchase of cotton harvested with the use of forced child labor were a breach of OECD Guidelines. In October 2012, as a result of the media attention that ensued, the German Federal Commissioner for Human Rights publicly condemned the practice of forced labor in Uzbekistan and called for a boycott of Uzbek cotton until state-sponsored forced labor of children and adults was eradicated.

State Department officials have told us privately that cotton campaign advocacy helped ensure that forced labor was one of the two top human rights issues the Obama administration raises in all senior-level contacts with Uzbekistan (the second issue is freedom of religion.) For several years, however, advocacy was less effective due to Uzbekistan’s role as an essential link in the logistics chain supplying U.S. forces in Afghanistan. We suffered a defeat when, after an intensive lobbying effort by the Administration, Congress voted to give the State Department authority to waive congressionally-mandated human rights sanctions. These sanctions had blocked most U.S. aid to the Uzbek government since 2005.

Nevertheless, coalition persistence has begun to pay off more recently. In spring 2013, coalition advocacy and a favorable change in U.S. legislation forced the State Department to downgrade Uzbekistan to Tier III, the lowest ranking in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report. At almost the same time, coalition advocacy in Geneva led the ILO’s annual conference to cite Uzbekistan as a particularly egregious violator of ILO commitments. Within weeks of these two events, authorities in Tashkent – after years of refusals – agreed to allow the ILO to monitor the use of child labor in the fall 2013 cotton harvest.

In June 2014, the State Department maintained Uzbekistan at Tier III. The Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) also accommodated the results of our monitoring of forced labor in Turkmenistan, and reinstated its status at 2WL (Watch List).[[4]](#footnote-4) Next year, the State Department will have to either upgrade this country to a higher level or downgrade to Tier III.

The campaign has also reached out to IFIs. In September 2013, three Uzbek NGOs filed a complaint with the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, criticizing the failure of the Project Appraisal Document endorsing the second phase of a loan under the Bank’s Rural Enterprise Support Project to acknowledge the issue of forced labor. A mission the Inspection Panel sent to Uzbekistan to check the facts produced a report that was quite critical of the project. This spring, the World Bank considered three new loans to Uzbekistan, two in the agricultural sector and one in education, totalling $460 million. The Coalition advocated for the Bank to hold off on these projects until more progress was made but on June 10, 2014, the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors decided to go ahead. However, the World Bank decided to invite third part monitoring on the social impact of the projects to be financed. The Bank representatives assured us that if the monitoring proves that forced labor continues in districts chosen for project implementation they will suspend the allocation of funds. This leaves some room for further engagement with the bank, and the coalition is determined to continue advocacy in cooperation with the Bank Information Center (BIC).

# Direct Advocacy, Research and Collaboration with the OSF Network

In addition to grant making, OSF has engaged in the cotton campaign through direct advocacy and the funding of research to serve as a basis for campaign advocacy efforts. Because advocacy is such a large part of the coalition’s work, OSF has been represented on the coalition’s Steering Committee by Jeff Goldstein (OSF-DC) and, until her departure from OSF, Jacqui Hale (OSEPI). Martin Konecny, who recently replaced Jacqui, is also getting actively involved in the campaign, organizing meetings for campaign representatives with EU officials and MEPs, as Jeff Goldstein of OSF-DC has already been doing for several years in the U.S. Since 2011, OSF-DC has hosted annual strategy and advocacy meetings of the Steering Committee, including advocacy sessions with U.S. government, ILO and World Bank officials.

For several years, the Central Eurasia Project advocated with the German government on Central Asia human rights issues, including forced labor in Uzbekistan, and published, along with colleagues from DC and Brussels and the ESP, five blogs at OSF’s Voices (see in Annex 3).

Research has been important to ensure that the campaign is recognized as fact-based. OSF initiated a series of yearly surveys of the use of forced labor during the cotton harvest and elaborated a methodology for this research. Since 2010, we have provided grants to the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, to monitor and publish annual surveys and snap-shot reports during the harvest. Unfortunately due to security challenges in the country, the monitoring is not country-wide. After each harvest, the Forum conducts supplementary interviews in many regions of the country to supplement direct observation during the harvest. Initially, this resulted in a delay in the Forum’s annual summary report that was detrimental to coalition advocacy efforts. As a result, we began providing additional support to the Forum to speed production of these reports. They provide essential ammunition to advocate with governments and international institutions and have informed reports on Uzbekistan from the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards and the annual U.S. government reports on human rights and trafficking.

In 2013, CEP funded two research projects, one to compare the models of cotton farming in Uzbekistan (strictly centralized) and Kazakhstan (relatively liberal), and another on the flow of finances in and around the Uzbek cotton sector. Findings were presented at the annual cotton campaign’s meeting in Washington, DC on May 1, 2014. The paper on cotton finances opens a new angle to approach the sector, focussing on cotton export revenues’ transparency and exposure of the vested interests involved.

Although OSF-DC and OSEPI have been always on board, engagement with other parts of the OSF network has been sporadic. In 2013 and 2014, we cooperated with ESP to oppose a $40-million grant by the Global Partnership for Education to the Uzbek government, communicating with the GPE Secretariat and raising concerns about the grant and its implications for Uzbek teachers. Kate Lapham of ESP published an OSF [blog](http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/aid-uzbekistan-should-not-help-forced-child-labor) piece in October 2013 (See Annex 3).

More efforts also need to be made to reach out to other thematic programs, for instance, the Program of Independent Journalism (PIJ) and Transparency and Accountability Initiative.

# Recent Developments, New Challenges and Future Prospects

The government of Uzbekistan’s decision to invite an ILO monitoring mission in 2013 (something the campaign had pursued for years), turned out to be something of a pyrrhic victory. The mission’s mandate was limited in scope to child labor and involved heavy participation by Uzbek officials. Contrary to the cotton campaign’s well-documented monitoring results, the ILO mission reported that: “It appears to the Mission that forced child labour has not been used on a systematic basis in Uzbekistan to harvest cotton in 2013.”

The ILO conclusions have had somewhat negative implications for our advocacy campaigns. The European Commission, for example, is planning to return the Textile Protocol to the EP for its approval, referencing the “progress” noted by the ILO. It was also cited by the World Bank in justifying the decision to move ahead with the new agricultural and educational projects.

Until the recent addition of Walk Free, the NGOs involved in the campaign have all focused on elite advocacy, while for participating mass membership organizations – such as the AFT and the AFL-CIO – the campaign has been a relatively low priority. As noted above, the coalition has generally not had an effective media strategy and the hiring of a coordinator did not significantly improve performance. In spite of some successes in engaging with the mass media (including a feature story on CNN International and a major piece in the New York Times last year), the coalition needs to adopt a more aggressive and comprehensive media and public outreach strategy. We have requested that ILRF rework their new grant proposal in June 2014 to address this shortcoming.

**Ranking of various aspects of the cotton campaign from the point of view of efforts and their effect (10 – max, 1 – min)\***



\* The assessment represents the opinion of the authors of this report.

A separate challenge relates to the coalition’s sustainability and public reputation. The Uzbek government charges that the campaign is financed as a protectionist measure by U.S. commercial interests. Other observers claim the campaign is a creature of OSF.

In early 2014, OSF-DC hired a development professional to advise on what the coalition might do to improve its sustainability and diversify funding. This task is complicated by the one-country, one-issue nature of the coalition. There have been some very preliminary discussions among coalition members to consider expanding the geographic scope or moving the focus beyond forced labor in cotton. This might increase access to funds, but could also divert attention from the coalition’s core mission, in which the Eurasia Program is most interested. Choosing a priority – keeping the EP’s preferred advocacy focus or increasing the likelihood of the coalition’s financial sustainability – is very much at the heart of the field versus concept distinction in OSF’s work and a dilemma still to be resolved.

In the near term, we plan to continue providing grants to the coalition’s current core NGO members – first of all ILRF (for U.S. and IFI advocacy, the Daewoo campaign and the Tariff Act Case), Anti-Slavery (EU and ILO advocacy) and the Uzbek-German Forum (monitoring and reporting on the use of forced labor). We will continue to work with the Coordinator and Steering Committee to improve the coalition’s effectiveness and sustainability, with a focus on expanding the coalition outside of the United States, creating and implementing a media strategy, and improving sustainability. With the ILO now on the ground and the Uzbeks having moved away from forcing young children to pick cotton, our advocacy will focus on the need for key international actors to effectively push the Uzbeks to begin dismantling the current command economy in the cotton industry, which can only function with the use of forced labor.

After the results of our 2013 Turkmenistan monitoring were imbedded into the U.S. TIP report, we decided in concert with the coalition members to continue monitoring state-orchestrated forced labor in Turkmenistan’s cotton industry. We will advocate with the ILO and EU to increase their attention on this country. New evidence coming from Uzbekistan on the widespread use of forced labor in the silk industry, the second agricultural area and source of export revenues after cotton, may open a new avenue for advocacy. Finally, within the context of our anti-corruption and good governance category of work for 2015 we plan to more broadly raise the issue of transparency and accountability of cotton and silk exports revenues in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

# Annex 1

**NGOs that received OSF funding for addressing forced labor in Uzbekistan since 2010**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Name of organization | Total amount allocated, US$ | No of grants | Mandate; division of labor |
| A1 | **INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY** |  |  | Advocacy with international actors: |
| 1 | International Labor Rights Forum\* | 632,620 | 6 | Coordination; ILO; World Bank; USG; retailers |
| 2 | Environmental Justice Foundation | 59,214 | 1 | UK government; British retailers and media |
| 3 | Anti-Slavery International\* | 288,394 | 3 | EU institutions; ILO |
| 4 | As You Sow (RSN) | 303,000 | 3 | Retailers; trade associations |
| 5 | European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights | 392,129 | 4 | OECD complaints; German government and media |
| 6 | GlobalWorks Foundation | 52,320 | 1 | Coordination; ILO |
| A2 | **ON-GROUND MONITORING** |  |  |  |
| 7 | Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights\* | 251,021 | 5 | Fieldwork surveys; reporting |
| 8 | Ezgulik, Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan | 24,900 | 1 | Fieldwork surveys; reporting |
| A3 | **RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS** |  |  |  |
| 9 | School of Oriental and African Studies | 7,568 | 1 | Publication of harvest reports |
| 10 | [Centre for Governance and Geopolitical Studies](https://na14.salesforce.com/001d000000JJvFd) | 26,546 | 1 | Publication of harvest reports |
| 11 | Centre for Development research | 36,027 | 1 | Research of cotton farming; publication |
| Grants total | | 2,073,739 | 27 |  |
| Consultancies | | 40,791 |  |  |
| Grand total: | | 2,114,530 |  |  |

\* Current OSF grantees

# Annex 2

**Companies the campaign is engaging with**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | ABC-Mart, Inc. |
| 2 | Abercrombie & Fitch |
| 3 | Adidas Group |
| 4 | Aeropostale |
| 5 | All Saints Retail Limited |
| 6 | American Apparel, Inc. |
| 7 | American Eagle Outfitters, Inc. |
| 8 | Ann Taylor Stores Corp. |
| 9 | Aoki Holdings, Inc. |
| 10 | Arcadia Group |
| 11 | Arco |
| 12 | Ascena Retail Group, Inc. (Dress Barn) |
| 13 | Asda |
| 14 | ASOS.com |
| 15 | Auchan |
| 16 | Bed Bath & Beyond |
| 17 | Bennetton |
| 18 | Billabong International Limited |
| 19 | Boden |
| 20 | Brooks Sports, Inc. |
| 21 | BTC Group |
| 22 | Buckle, Inc. (The) |
| 23 | Burberry Group, Plc |
| 24 | C&A |
| 25 | Carhartt |
| 26 | Carrefour |
| 27 | Carters |
| 28 | Champion Gear for Sports |
| 29 | Chico's FAS, Inc. |
| 30 | Children Worldwide Fashion |
| 31 | Children's Place Retail Stores, Inc. |
| 32 | Chiyoda Co Ltd |
| 33 | Coach, Inc. |
| 34 | Columbia Sportswear Company |
| 35 | Corte Ingles Group |
| 36 | Costco |
| 37 | Dada Sons, Star Cotton |
| 38 | Daewoo International |
| 39 | DAKS |
| 40 | Debenhams Retail |
| 41 | Dillard’s |
| 42 | Eddie Bauer Holdings, Inc. |
| 43 | Eileen Fisher |
| 44 | EMC Distribution, Casino |
| 45 | Esprit Holdings |
| 46 | Fast Retailing Co., Ltd (Uniqlo) |
| 47 | Fat Face |
| 48 | Fifth and Pacific Companies, Inc. |
| 49 | Forever 21 |
| 50 | Fruit of Loom |
| 51 | Gap, Inc. |
| 52 | Gear for Sport |
| 53 | G-III Apparel Group, Ltd. |
| 54 | Gildan Activewear |
| 55 | G-Star International B.V. |
| 56 | G-Star Raw C.V. |
| 57 | Gucci |
| 58 | Guess?, Inc. |
| 59 | H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB |
| 60 | Hanesbrands, Inc. |
| 61 | Honeys Co Ltd |
| 62 | Hugo Boss |
| 63 | Iconix Brand Group, Inc. |
| 64 | IKEA |
| 65 | Inditex |
| 66 | Indorama Corporation |
| 67 | J Crew |
| 68 | Jack Wills Ltd |
| 69 | Jaeger |
| 70 | JC Penney (Liz Claiborne) |
| 71 | Jockey International, Inc. |
| 72 | John Lewis Partnership |
| 73 | Jones Apparel Group |
| 74 | Kathmandu |
| 75 | Kohl’s |
| 76 | Konaka Co Ltd |
| 77 | Kyoto Kimono Yuzen Co Ltd |
| 78 | L Brands (formerly Limited Brands) |
| 79 | Levi Strauss & Co |
| 80 | Li & Fung |
| 81 | LL Bean |
| 82 | Loblaw Companies Limited (Joe Fresh) |
| 83 | Louis Dreyfus Commodities |
| 84 | Lululemon Athletica . |
| 85 | Mackays Stores Limited (M&Co) |
| 86 | Macy's |
| 87 | Made-By |
| 88 | Maidenform Brands, Inc. |
| 89 | Marimekko |
| 90 | Marks & Spencer |
| 91 | Matrix APA |
| 92 | Melrose Textile |
| 93 | Men’s Warehouse, Inc. (The) |
| 94 | Men’s Wearhouse USA |
| 95 | Metro Group |
| 96 | Michael Kors Holdings, Ltd. |
| 97 | Monoprix |
| 98 | Monsoon Accessorize |
| 99 | Mothercare |
| 100 | N Brown |
| 101 | New Balance |
| 102 | New Look Retailers |
| 103 | Next Retail |
| 104 | Nike, Inc |
| 105 | Nordstrom |
| 106 | Olam |
| 107 | Olympicpromo |
| 108 | Otto Stadtlander |
| 109 | Pacific Sunwear |
| 110 | Pal Co Ltd |
| 111 | Pan-Pacific |
| 112 | Patagonia, Inc. |
| 113 | Peacocks |
| 114 | Pentland Brands |
| 115 | Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation (Calvin Klein) |
| 116 | Point, Inc. |
| 117 | POSCO |
| 118 | Pottery Barn |
| 119 | PPR Group (Puma, Volcom, Yves Saint Laurent, Gucci, Balenciaga, Alexander McQueen, Stella McCartney, Bottega Veneta) |
| 120 | Primark |
| 121 | Quiksilver, Inc. |
| 122 | Ralph Lauren Corp. |
| 123 | Recreational Equipment Inc. |
| 124 | Regatta |
| 125 | River Island |
| 126 | Rohan Designs |
| 127 | Ross Stores, Inc. |
| 128 | Ruia Group |
| 129 | Russell |
| 130 | S&M Fashion |
| 131 | Sears Holding Company |
| 132 | Shimamura Co Ltd |
| 133 | Skybrands AS |
| 134 | Spalding |
| 135 | Start Today Co Ltd |
| 136 | STITCH Fashion |
| 137 | SuperGroup Plc [Note 2] |
| 138 | Talbots |
| 139 | Target Australia Pty Ltd |
| 140 | Target Corporation |
| 141 | TaylorMade |
| 142 | Tchibo GmbH |
| 143 | Tesco |
| 144 | TJX Companies, Inc. |
| 145 | Tokyo Derica Co Ltd |
| 146 | Toys 'R' Us |
| 147 | Trendy for Fashion |
| 148 | True Religion Apparel, Inc. |
| 149 | Tumi Holdings, Inc. |
| 150 | Under Armour, Inc. |
| 151 | Union Jean Company |
| 152 | United Arrows Ltd |
| 153 | Urban Outfitters |
| 154 | Vera Bradley, Inc. |
| 155 | VF Corporation |
| 156 | W lamb |
| 157 | Wacoal Holdings Corporation (ADR) |
| 158 | Wal Mart Stores, Inc. |
| 159 | Walt Disney Company (The) |
| 160 | Warnaco Group, Inc. |
| 161 | WE Fashion |
| 162 | White Company (The) |
| 163 | Wigwam Mills, Inc. |
| 164 | Williams Sonoma |
| 165 | Wilster Apparel Group |
| 166 | Windsor Textiles |
| 167 | Winter Kate |

# Annex 3

**Reports published with OSF financial support:**

“Invisible to the World? The Dynamics of Forced Child Labor in the Cotton sector of Uzbekistan,” SOAS: London, 2009, <http://www.soas.ac.uk/cccac/events/cotton-sector-in-central-asia-2005/file49842.pdf>;

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“Forced Child Labor in the Cotton Sector in Uzbekistan: Some Changes - but Not for the Better,” *Centre d’Etudes en Géopolitique et Gouvernance*: Grenoble, 2012, <http://www.centregeopolitique.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=64&Itemid=194&lang=fr>

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“A Systemic Problem: State-Sponsored Forced Labour in Uzbekistan’s Cotton Sector Continues in 2012,” Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, 2013, <http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/SystemicProblem-ForcedLabour_Uzbekistan_Cotton_Continues.pdf>

“Forced Labor in Uzbekistan: Report on the 2013 Cotton Harvest,” Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, 2014, <http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Forced-Labor-in-Uzbekistan-Report-2013.pdf>

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“A Warning for Retailers: Purchase Uzbek Cotton and Risk Your Reputation,” Alisher Ilkhamov, July 16, 2012, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/warning-retailers-purchase-uzbek-cotton-and-risk-your-reputation>

“Changing the Pattern, but Not the Policy: Uzbekistan Shifts the Demographics of Forced Labor,” Jacqueline Hale & Alisher Ilkhamov, January 17, 2013, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/changing-pattern-not-policy-uzbekistan-shifts-demographics-forced-labor>

“Aid to Uzbekistan Should Not Help Forced Child Labor,” Kate Lapham, October 14, 2013, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/aid-uzbekistan-should-not-help-forced-child-labor>

“The World Bank Risks Dirtying Its Hands in Uzbekistan,” Jeff Goldstein,

Posted: 06/13/2014 5:37 pm EDT Updated: 06/13/2014 5:59 pm ED, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffgoldstein/the-world-bank-risks-dirt_b_5493130.html>

**Public events hosted by OSF:**

Tackling Forced Labor in Authoritarian Contexts, OSF-Brussels, February 23, 2010, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/events/tackling-forced-labor-authoritarian-contexts>

Forced Child Labor: The Soviet Legacy in Post-Soviet Central Asia, OSF-NY, January 20, 2011, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/events/forced-child-labor-soviet-legacy-post-soviet-central-asia>

Forced Sterilization and Forced Labor in Uzbekistan, December 11, 2013, OSF-NY, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/events/social-cost-uzbek-cotton-industry>

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2. For more on the Special Rapporteur see: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/slavery/srslavery/pages/srslaveryindex.aspx>. The Global Slavery Index is a project of the new Australian based NGO Walk Free and can be found here: <http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/>. On the new protocol: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/press-releases/WCMS\_246549/lang--en/index.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. http://www.sourcingnetwork.org/the-cotton-pledge/ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For more on the 2014 report: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/ [↑](#footnote-ref-4)